Docs Fault Lab
Split commitments
A proposer sends its commitment to one co-proposer only. The attestations disagree and the cblock is skipped.
A proposer tries to get its block counted by some validators and not others, by telling one co-proposer and keeping it from the other. Shows Lemma 2.2, selective-censorship resistance.
The attack in the run
In window 4, proposer 3 sends its commitments to co-proposer 1 only.
What the protocol does
Co-proposer 1 attests proposer 3's commitment as on time; co-proposer 2 never received it and attests ⊥. The vectors differ, so no validator considers the slot agreed (Agreement, condition (a)), validators vote skip, and the cblock is skip-certified.
A byzantine proposer can make a slot skip this way; it cannot make validators execute different blocks. The guarantees are paid for with skips, never with a wrong block (What makes a slot skip).
The evidence
The run ends done with skip_certificate for the cblock. The evidence of a recorded run:
[
{
"description": "Co-proposer 1 attested the attacker's commitment and co-proposer 2 never received it: the vectors differ, no set is agreed, and the cblock is skip-certified.",
"hashes": [],
"kind": "skip_certificate",
"observedFragments": null,
"proposer": null,
"signatures": [],
"slot": 64,
"threshold": null,
"txId": null
}
]Run it
acrux lab run --scenario split-commitments --seed demo --out runs/split-commitmentsOr start it on /lab, or with POST /v1/lab/runs and { "scenario": "split-commitments" }. Fault Lab runs