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Split commitments

A proposer sends its commitment to one co-proposer only. The attestations disagree and the cblock is skipped.

A proposer tries to get its block counted by some validators and not others, by telling one co-proposer and keeping it from the other. Shows Lemma 2.2, selective-censorship resistance.

The attack in the run

In window 4, proposer 3 sends its commitments to co-proposer 1 only.

What the protocol does

Co-proposer 1 attests proposer 3's commitment as on time; co-proposer 2 never received it and attests ⊥. The vectors differ, so no validator considers the slot agreed (Agreement, condition (a)), validators vote skip, and the cblock is skip-certified.

A byzantine proposer can make a slot skip this way; it cannot make validators execute different blocks. The guarantees are paid for with skips, never with a wrong block (What makes a slot skip).

The evidence

The run ends done with skip_certificate for the cblock. The evidence of a recorded run:

outcome.json evidence
[
  {
    "description": "Co-proposer 1 attested the attacker's commitment and co-proposer 2 never received it: the vectors differ, no set is agreed, and the cblock is skip-certified.",
    "hashes": [],
    "kind": "skip_certificate",
    "observedFragments": null,
    "proposer": null,
    "signatures": [],
    "slot": 64,
    "threshold": null,
    "txId": null
  }
]

Run it

Terminal
acrux lab run --scenario split-commitments --seed demo --out runs/split-commitments

Or start it on /lab, or with POST /v1/lab/runs and { "scenario": "split-commitments" }. Fault Lab runs