Docs Fault Lab
Censorship
Two proposers drop a transaction the third carries. The honest block is in the agreed set and the transaction finalizes.
Proposers collude to keep a transaction out: with one leader, one refusal is enough. Shows Lemma 2.2, selective-censorship resistance.
The attack in the run
A few slots before window 4 the lab sends a signed transfer to all three proposers of the window, for slot 66. Proposers 1 and 2 leave it out of their blocks; proposer 3 includes it as usual.
What the protocol does
Proposer 3's block holds the transaction. The two others cannot drop that block: proposer 3's attestation for the window's first slot reaches every correct validator by the attestation deadline, and no validator votes for the window's cblocks without it (The attestation deadline). So the agreed set is P = {1, 2, 3}, proposer 3's block is decrypted with the others, the transaction is merged into the slot's order and executes in slot 66.
The censors' only other move is to make the slot skip; they cannot make it execute without the honest block.
The evidence
The run ends done with transaction_included with the transaction ID and the slot it executed in, carried only by proposer 3. The evidence of a recorded run:
[
{
"description": "Proposers 1 and 2 left the transaction out; proposer 3 carried it, its block was in the agreed set, and the transaction executed in slot 66 (finalized).",
"hashes": [],
"kind": "transaction_included",
"observedFragments": null,
"proposer": 3,
"signatures": [],
"slot": 66,
"threshold": null,
"txId": "5138be5f21c1a7116479d811996001ef48c28f3d7d0449024400c88a793878b2"
}
]Run it
acrux lab run --scenario censorship --seed demo --out runs/censorshipOr start it on /lab, or with POST /v1/lab/runs and { "scenario": "censorship" }. Fault Lab runs